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Abstract: To study the impact of response time on extended warranty services (EWS), the pricing strategy of EWS is
discussed with different response time in a competitive environment. Considering of a two-level supply chain composed of
one manufacturer, one self-owned retailer (SR) and one franchise retailer (FR), there exists the differentiated response time
in EWS provided by SR and FR. Based on the consumer demand function in two cases, the optimal pricing strategy of EWS
for supply chain members is analyzed. Research shows that: (1) The EWS price of SR increases with the increasing of the
differential response time, but which of FR decreases and changing faster. (2) The manufacturer is more profitable when the
differential response time is smaller, and two retailers’ profits continue to increase as the differential response time
increasing. (3) The retailers' profits are always higher than the manufacturer’s, and both supply chain members will choose
the market that consumers are more sensitive to differentiated response time to realize their respective benefits. The
conclusion provides enlightenment and reference for enterprises to make decision of EWS.

Keywords: extended warranty service, supply chain, response time, pricing strategy

1.

INTRODUCTION
Consumers will reduce the perceived risk of products by purchasing extended warranty services (EWS)[1],

which is regarded as an important part of after sales service guarantee system, especially in durable products
such as automobiles and household appliances[2]. According to market research data, the profit from sales of
EWS is as high as 18 times compared to the profit from sales of products, and the average profit margin is
usually 50-60%

[3]

. EWS price directly affects the market share and the market competition

[4]

, and EWS

responsiveness is also one of the market competition points under the leadership of the time-sensitive consumers
[5]

. Moreover, the responsiveness of EWS is often closely related to the price, for example, in Boeing, they set

service pricing and response time standards according to the level of service, i.e. significant requests, emergent
requests and routine requests. But what exactly is the relationship between EWS pricing and EWS response time?
How do we make optimal pricing strategy based on response time?
The current research mainly focuses on the pricing decisions of EWS with profit maximization of supply
chain, such as Peng et al.[6]studied the online shopping supply chain coordination strategy of extended warranty
services by building a two-stage dynamic game model. Zhang[7] analyzed whether manufacturers offering
extended warranty services engage in channel intrusions and the impact of channel intrusions on other members
of the supply chain. Chen et al.[8]constructed two competing retailer supply chains to study different pricing
strategies of manufacturers in the context of a separate negotiation strategy, average cost, and actual cost
negotiation strategy. Mart et al.[9]researched the pricing decision of extended warranty services under different
*
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pricing contracts. According to whether the products are homogeneous, Tang et al.[10]study the supply chain
coordination between products and extended warranty services. Zhao et al.[11built a supply chain network equilibrium
model to study the optimal parameters for retailers to provide extended warranty services. Zhang [12]found that
retailers chose to provide extended warranty services by themselves as the most favorable decision. Chakraborty et
al.[13]analyzed the performance analysis and selection of contracts for the pricing of extended warranty services in
competitive markets. Chen et al.[14] discussed the pricing of extended warranty services, product price pricing and joint
pricing in the environment of centralized decision and decentralized decision in supply chain.
The current research about service pricing under response time is mainly from the performance
maximization of supply chain, such as Shen et al.[15] studied the response time and product price act on the
market at the same time, and established a profit model based on the deterministic demand function to find the
optimal decision in the two level supply chain market. Lin et al.[16] discussed a two-stage supply chain
decision-making problem under the influence of product price sensitivity and response time changes. Xu et
al.[17]analyzed the relationship between retailers' order volume and delivery time differences considering of
consumers' expectations for different delivery times. Liu et al.[18] established the demand function to discuss the
large or small impact on the performance of the entire supply chain under centralized and decentralized
conditions. Lu et al.[19]found that considering the same-day response and the next-day response, as the delivery
time increases, the retailer's online sales price decreases. Mo et al.[20] constructed price discrimination decisions
to support spare parts services under mass customization of manufacturing companies. Tan et al.[21] researched
the impact of equity concerns on the lead time of network direct sales. Wu et al. [22]studied the relationship
between the price and response time to achieve the greatest benefit.
In summary, the research of service response time and EWS pricing is in two parallel directions.
Considering the characteristics of the EWS, this paper adopts the response time as the EWS pricing model of
basic performance to provide consumers with a certain warranty service quality, discusses the pricing of EWS
with differential response times among competing retailers, and provides a reference basis for enterprise to
make EWS pricing decisions.
2.

MODELING

2.1 Problem description
There is a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and two retailers, and the retailers include one
self-owned retailer (SR) and one franchise retailer (FR) offers a differential response time in EWS.
Manufacturers providing EWS to SR and FR. The smaller the difference between the response time provided by
FR and SR, the higher the utility to the consumer. Consumers often consider the utility of EWS to choose FR or
SR. The model is shown in Figure 1.
Manufacturer
w

w

SR

k
FR

p2

p1

Δt

Consumer
Figure 1. EWS with differential response time
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The notations in the text and their meanings are described in Table 1 below.
Table 1. The notations and meanings
Notation

Meaning

Notation

Meaning

m

Manufacturer



Consumer price sensitivity to retailers' EWS

ri

Retailer i(i= 1,2)



Consumer sensitivity
response times

w

t

Poor response time for EWS

w*

Wholesale price of parts and components
required for EWS.
Optimal EWS pricing.

pi

Pricing of EWS for retailer units.

Ui

pi *

Pricing for retailers' optimal EWS.

D1

Referral fee paid by the FR ( k   p2 D2 ).
The basic valuation of consumers for EWS.
Evenly distributed on [0,1].
The substitution rate between the two EWS
( 0    1 ).

D2

k
v





m*

r *

to

differentiated

EWS cost factor
The utility function for consumers to purchase
EWS
Demand from SR
Demand from FR
Manufacturer's profit under differential
response time
Retailer's profit under differential response
time

2.2 Demand function
The response time of FR is different from SR, which is expressed in ∆t. Then the utility obtained by
consumers from SR and FR are:

U1  v   p1

(1)

U 2   v   p2   ln

1
t

(2)

Consumers will choose the party with the greater utility to purchase the EWS, i.e. choose max ( u1 , u2 ,0 ).
Using the same idea as above, it can be obtained that consumers face three critical situations when choosing a
buyer, namely u1  0, u2  0, u1  u2 . For the convenience of discussion, the critical valuations are defined
as v1 , v2 , v3 respectively, i.e. v1   p1 , v2   p2   ln

1
1
/  , v3  [ ( p1  p2 )   ln ] /1  
t
t

. v1 , v2 , v3 will get different

extended service price ranges when different conditions are met, and the demand function under each range will
be obtained. The specific discussion is as follows.
(1)When v1  v2 and v3  1 , both retailers will have demand for EWS, and the unit EWS price meets the
following conditions:

p1  (1     ln

1
1
) /   p2   p1   ln / 
t
t

(3)

(2)When v1  v2 and v3  1 , u1  u2 , consumers only choose to purchase EWS from FR, and the unit EWS
price meets the following conditions:

p2  p1  (1     ln

1
) /
t

(4)

(3)When v1  v2 , u1  u2 , consumer only chooses to purchase EWS from SR, and the unit EWS price meets
the conditions as:

p2   p1  (  ln

1
) /
t

(5)

(4) When u1  0, u2  0 , consumer will not purchase the EWS.
It can be obtained that the specific purchasing behavior of consumers when providing EWS with
differential response times is shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Consumer’s choice of EWS

In generally, it is discussed for situations where consumers will have a purchase demand for both retailers,
and the demand functions D1 and D2 as follows:

D1  1  [ ( p1  p2 )   ln

3.

1
1
1
] / (1   ) ; D2  [ ( p1  p2 )   ln ] / (1   )  ( p2   ln ) / 
t
t
t

(6)

DECISION ANALYSIS
The manufacturer first determines the wholesale price of EWS, and the two retailers set the price of EWS

according to the wholesale price. FR also need to pay a certain introduction fee k in proportion to the income to
the manufacturer, k   p2 D2 (  is a fixed value). Draw on the conclusion of Andy (2000) [23], the benefit
functions of supply members under decentralized decision are as follow:

Max m  w(1 
*

 ( p1  p2 )   ln

w*

1

1
1
1
 ( p1  p2 )   ln
 p2   ln
t )  ( w   p )(
t 
t )
2
1


(7)

1

 p2   ln
 ( p1  p2 )
  ( p1  p2 )
t )
Max r ( p1  w)(1 
)  ((1   ) p2  w 
)(

2
1


1



2

t
p *, p *
*

1

(8)

2

Proposition 1: When two retailers provide EWS with a differential response time, the manufacturer's
wholesale price and the two retailers' price optimal solutions are functions (9), (10), and (11).

( (  1)(4   (  2) 2 )  t 2 (8  12 (  2)   2 (  2) 2
(2   (  4))  2 (8   (24   (4  17))))  t 2 (8(  1) 2
1
 2 (  2) 2 (2   (  4))  2 (8   (20   (4  15)))) ln( ))
t
w* 
8t 2 (  1) 2 (  2)

p1 * 

 (  1)  t 2 (   ln(

p2 *  

1
1
))(4   (2   (  4)))  2t 2 (   ln( )  2)
t
t
8t 2 (  1)



 (  1)  t 2 (6  4   (6   (  4)))    ln
4t 2 (  1)(  2)

1 

t 

(9)

(10)

(11)
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Firstly, it is proved whether the optimal solution of EWS price exists when the SR and FR provide EWS
with different response time under the decentralized decision. For function (2), the second-order Hessian matrix
of the income function for prices p1 and p2 is:

  r *

2
 p1 *
H ( p1 *, p2 *)  
2
  r *
 p * p *
1
 2
2

  r *   2

p1 * p2 *   1  
2

  r *   (2   )

p2 2 *   1  
2

(2   ) 
1 

2 (  1) 

（1  ）

(12)

  r * 2

 0 , only the conditions 4(1   )   (2   )2 need to be met, availability H 2  0 ,
p12 * 1  
2

Since

proves that there is an equilibrium solution that makes the retailer's earnings optimal.
Secondly, p1 and p2 are obtained by derivative of p1 and p2 in function (8), and solve the system of

 r *
 r *
 m *
8 (  1)2 (  2)
 0 and
 0 . Through a second derivative of w and

 0 , the
p1 *
p2 *
w2 *
 ( (  2)2  4(  1))2
2

manufacturer can make the best wholesale price. Let

 m *
 0 , and
w*

w

is brought into

p1 , p2 , then the

complete equilibrium solution (9), (10), (11) can be obtained, QED.
Proposition 2: When two retailers provide EWS with different response time, the optimal price p1 * and

p2 * are all decreasing functions of price sensitivity  and increasing functions of response time sensitivity  .
Through the first derivative of p1 * and p2 * with  and  , the follow result is obtained:
p1 *



4  (   ln

p2 *



(   ln

p1 *



ln

p2 *


Because the denominator in

1
1
)(4   (2   (  4)))  2(   ln )
t
t
8 2 (1   )

1
)(6  4   (6   (  4)))
t
4 2 (  1)(  2)

1
(2  4   (2   (  4)))
t
8 (  1)

ln

1
(6  4   (6   (  4)))
t
4 (  1)(  2)

(13)

(14)

(15)

(16)

p2 *
p1 *
p1 * p2 *
,
and
are all greater than 0，and the denominator of





is less than 0, it is only necessary to analyze the molecular size of each first derivative.
As (   ln

1
1
)(4   (2   (  4)))  2(   ln  2)  0 , then
t
t

2  4   (2   (  4))  0 , then

p2 *
p1 *
 0 . Similarly, as
 0 and



p1 *
p2 *
<0 and
>0. QED.



Proposition 3: When two retailers provide EWS with different response time, p1 * is the increasing
function of differential response time t , and p2 * is the decreasing function.
Through the first derivative of p1 * and p2 * with t , the follow result is obtained:
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p1 *

t
p2 *

t
Since the denominator in

1
(2  4   (2   (  4)))
t
8t 3 (  1)

2 (  1)  t  ln

1
(6  4   (6   (  4)))
t
4t 3 (  1)(  2)

(17)

2 (  1)  t  ln

(18)

p2 *
p1 *
is less than 0, the denominator in
is greater than 0, and only the
t
t

size of the molecule needs to be analyzed, in the same way as proposition 2, it can be obtained that
and
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p1 *
0
t

p2 *
 0 . QED.
t
From proposition 2 and proposition 3, it shows that when FR and ER provide differentiated response time

EWS and consumers are more sensitive to the price, they should appropriately reduce the EWS price, and the
optimal price increases with the sensitivity of differentiated response time, which also prompts FR to choose
markets where consumers are more sensitive to differentiated response times. However, for the differentiated
response time, the change of the two optimal prices is the opposite, and retailers can cooperate to control the
differentiated response time within a certain range to reduce the gap between prices.
4.

EXAMPLE ANALYSIS

To analysis EWS prices and profits affected by response times, there are the following basic data:
  0.1 ,   0.2 ,   0.4 .
(1)When   0.2 and   0.3 . Figure 3 and 4 describe that when the FR provides differential response time,
the optimal price p1 * of SR decreases with the differential response time t , while the optimal price p2 * of FR
increases with t ; The manufacturer's optimal wholesale price w* increases first and then decreases with t .
The manufacturer's profit increases with t , and the retailer's total profit decreases with t . This shows that the
increase of differentiated response time t is unfavorable to manufacturers and beneficial to the total profit of
retailers. With the increase of t , retailers' profits are mainly brought by SR. Therefore, in order to provide
EWS for retailers and stabilize the market, FR will strengthen service responsiveness, that is, narrow the gap
between response time and avoid large price gap with SR.

Figure 3. The effect of Δt on p1*,p2 *,w * under different response time
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Figure 4. The effect of Δt on Πm *,Πr * under different response time

(2)When t  0.6 . Figure 5 and Figure 6 respectively describe that the optimal price of the two retailers
decreases with the price sensitivity  and increases with the response time sensitivity  . the optimal price of the
retailers changes more violently with the response time sensitivity, and the greater the increase when the price
sensitivity is lower. This shows that SR and FR are more willing to choose a market with low price sensitivity
and high response time, so as to formulate a higher premium price.

Figure 5. The effect of α β on p1 * under different response time

Figure 6. The effect of α β on p 2 * under different response time

(3)When t  0.6 . Figure 7 and 8 respectively describe that the manufacturer's profit and the retailer's total
profit decrease with the price sensitivity  , while the manufacturer's profit increases with the response time
sensitivity  , and the retailer's total profit first decreases and then increases. Moreover, the impact of  on the
total profits of manufacturers and retailers in the supply chain is affected by  . When t  is low, the profits of
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both sides of the supply chain change more strongly with  . This shows that it is beneficial for retailers to
choose markets with low price sensitivity and low or high response time. For manufacturers, they can only
choose the market with low price sensitivity and high responsiveness of extended warranty service. Therefore,
when FR provide EWS with different response time, manufacturers will encourage FR to shorten the difference
in response time and enter the market with high response time, so as to achieve a win-win situation for
manufacturers and retailers and obtain greater profits.

Figure 7. The effect of α β on Πm * under different response time

Figure 8. The effect of α β on Πr * under different response time

5.

CONCLUSION
By introducing the response time into the pricing decision of EWS, the pricing strategy of EWS provided

by competing retailers with differential response time is studied, and the following conclusions are mainly
formed:
(1)The optimal EWS price of SR increases with the differentiated response time, while the optimal EWS
price of the FR decreases with the differentiated response time.
(2)With the increase of differentiated response time of EWS, it is unfavorable to benefit the manufacturer's
profit and the retailer's total profit.
(3)For retailers and manufacturers, the choice of market pricing strategies where consumers are less price
sensitive to EWS and have higher response time of EWS can get greater benefits.
The study also found that the change in the differential response time of FR will lead to changes in the
price of SR, the greater the differential response time, the higher the price of SR, while the FR should
appropriately reduce the EWS price of to attract consumers because the response time is not dominant. Retailers
are always more profitable than manufacturers, and both supply chain members will opt for differentiated
response time-sensitive markets to maximize their interests.

86

The Twenty one Wuhan International Conference on E-Business－Information Systems and Operations Management

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This research was supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant 72062019,
Postdoctoral Research Project of Jiangxi Province under Grant 2019KY13, Social Science Foundation of Hubei
Province under Grant 2018044, and Research Project Plan of China Logistics Society and China Federation of
Logistics and Purchasing in 2022.

REFERENCES
[1] Week W. (2015). Extended Warranty Administrators: While Auto and PC Manufacturers Have the Top

Spots,

Insurance

Companies and

Third

Party Administrators

Grab

the

Bulk of the

Pie.

Http://www.warratyweek.com, January 19.
[2] Kelley C.A., Conant J. S. ( 2019). Extended warranties: Consumer and Manufacturer Perceptions. Journal

of Consumer Affairs, 25(1): 68–83.
[3] Berner R. (2004). The Warranty Windfall. Business Week, 12(20): 2004.
[4] WESTS, KUJAWSKID ,CONSULTANTS. (2016). Service Pricing Strategies for Maintenance Service.

Proceedings of the 23rd European Operations Management Association conference, June 17-22, Trondheim,
Norway .
[5] Gupta A, Su B. C., Walter Z. (2004). An Empirical Study of Consumer Switching from Traditional to

Electronic Channels: A Purchase-decision Process Perspective. International Journal of Electronic
Commerce, 8(3): 131-161.
[6] Peng Y.T., Lu H., Zhao Y. P. (2021). Research on Online Shopping Supply Chain Coordination Strategy for

Extended Warranty Service. Industrial Engineering, 24(04): 45-55.(in Chinese)
[7] Zhang Q. N. (2021). Channel Intrusion Strategies for Manufacturers Considering Extended Warranty

Services. Chinese Collective Economy, (29): 81-82.(in Chinese)
[8] Chen X., Li L., Zhou M. (2012). Manufacturer’s Pricing Strategy for Supply Chain with Warranty

Period-dependent Demand . Omega, 40(2): 807~816.
[9] Mart N. V, Roels G. (2011). Competing for Shelf Space. Production and Operations Management, 20 (1) :

32-46.
[10] Tang H., Ai X. Z., Zhong L. (2021). Research on Supply Chain Coordination Mechanism Based on

Competition between Product and Extended Warranty Service. Chinese Journal of Management,
18(06):929-937.(in Chinese)
[11] Zhao J.B, Zhou Y. (2021). Research on Supply Chain Network Equilibrium under Extended Warranty

Service Provided by Retailers. Soft Science, 35(04): 137-144.(in Chinese)
[12] ZHANG Y. F. (2021). Product Dual-channel Supply Chain Extended Warranty Service Model. Systems

Engineering, 39(02):81-89. (in Chinese)
[13] Chakraborty T, Chauhan S, Vidyarthi N. (2015). Coordination and Competition in a Common Retailer

Channel: Wholesale Price versus Revenue-Sharing Mechanisms. International Journal of Production
Economics,166:103-118.
[14] ZHENG C., AI X. Z, LI X.J, WANG G.F. (2018). Selection of Two Pricing Contracts for Supply Chain

Extended Warranty Services for Competitive Retailers. Journal of Systems Engineering, 33(05): 674-686.
(in Chinese)
[15] Shen C.L., Zhan G.X. (2019). Pricing and Lead time Joint Decisions In Two-echelon Supply Chain with

Retailers’ Competition. International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management Papers.
Xiamen University Press, 552-557.(in Chinese)
[16] Lin C. P, Hsieh C. C. (2019). Lead Time Decisions under Lead-time Sensitive Demand with Demand

The Twenty one Wuhan International Conference on E-Business－Information Systems and Operations Management

87

Disruptions. International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management Papers. Xiamen
University Press, 455-460.(in Chinese)
[17] Xu F., Wang H. L. (2020). Dual-channel Ordering and Coordination Optimization Strategy Under Delivery

Time Difference. Operations Research and Management, 29(04): 121-129.(in Chinese)
[18] Liu L. M, Parlarm, Zhu S. X. (2011). Pricing and Lead Time Decisions in Decentralized Supply Chains.

Management Science, 53(5): 713-725.
[19] Lu T., Zhang S.B. (2019). Research on Pricing Strategies of Online and Offline Dual-channel Supply

Chains: A Dual-channel Pricing Analysis of Retailers Based on The Impact of Delivery Time Sensitivity on
Prices.Price Theory and Practice, (07):124-127.(in Chinese)
[20] MO D. Y. ,TSENG M. M, WANG Y. (2016). Mass Customizing Spare Parts Support Services Based on

Response Time with Inventory Pooling Strategies. IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, 63(3):
305-315.
[21] Tan C.Q., Yi W.T. (2019). Dual-channel Supply Chain Pricing and Network Direct Sales Delivery Time

Strategy. Journal of Systems Engineering, 34(05):683-699. (in Chinese)
[22] WU Q., CHEN J.H., HUANG F., ZHANG Y.Q. (2018). Research on Pricing Strategy of Remote

Monitoring Service of Manufacturing Enterprises Considering Response Time. Journal of Xi'an University
of Technology, 34(04):510-515.(in Chinese)
[23] Tsay A. A., Agrawal N.(2000). Channel Dynamics Under Price and Service Competition. Manufacturing &

Service Operations Management, 2(4): 372-391.

